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“The century of Einstein and Planck was also the century of Hitler.”
—Vassili Grossman, Life and Fate
Introduction
Genocide can be deﬁned as a complex process of systematic persecution and annihila-
tion directed at a particular group of people by a government. In the twentieth century,
between 40 and 60 million people fell victim to deliberate genocidal policies.1 The
twenty-ﬁrst century began not much better, with genocidal episodes in Darfur and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. We can speak of genocide when individuals are targeted
for persecution and murder on the basis of their presumed or imputed membership in a
group, rather than for any reason relating to their individual characteristics or their par-
ticipation in certain acts. Although it makes little sense to work with victim minima, we
can state that a genocidal process always involves a society at large and that genocide
often destroys a signiﬁcant—often critical—part of the affected community or commu-
nities. Arguably, genocidal processes are particularly malicious and destructive because
they target all members of a group, mostly innocent and defenseless people who are per-
secuted and killed regardless of their behavior. The term “genocide” always denotes a
brutal and colossal collective criminality. For this reason, the phenomenon of genocide
is distinct from other forms of mass violence, such as war, civil war, or massacre.2
The term “genocide” was coined by the Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin
(1900–1959). While attending law school at the University of L’viv (Lwów/Lemberg),
Lemkin became interested in why international law had been unable to curb collective
violence by states. He had studied massacres, and became convinced that governments
should not be allowed to harm unarmed civilians. During World War II, Lemkin intro-
duced the new concept of genocide, a neologism formed from the Greek genos (“people”
or “race”) and the Latin caedere (“to kill”). Lemkin deﬁned genocide in 1944 as “a coor-
dinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”3 After
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his death in 1959, the term fell into disuse. In the 1970s, however, historians and social
scientists rediscovered the concept and published the ﬁrst academic studies on geno-
cide. Since then, the number of publications on genocide has continued to grow, and
today genocide studies is a respectable academic specialty with its own journals and
research institutes in North America, Europe, Australia, and South America.4
The central question in genocide studies, How can we explain the fact that
genocidal violence has occurred in culturally, technologically, and politically different
societies?, has three sub-questions. First, what are the causes of a genocidal process?
Or, how does the process of systematically destroying a category of people begin? Sec-
ond, how does a genocidal process develop? There are strong indications that when
such a process has been set in motion, it develops its own dynamic; how exactly does
that dynamic evolve from the individual to the most collective level? Finally, what are
the consequences of genocide? How do perpetrators, victims, and third parties continue
to live after genocide? How do they process the traumatic events—or not? Much useful
research has examined the evolution of separate genocides, such as the destruction
of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915, the Holocaust, and the genocides in Cambodia
(1975–1979), Rwanda (1994), and Bosnia (during the civil wars in the former Yugosla-
via). We also know a great deal about speciﬁc aspects of genocidal processes: research
has investigated how a fairly “normal” civil society turns into a persecutory society, the
motives of ordinary killers, the power and effect of charismatic leaders, and the gender
aspects of violence, among other issues. In this article, I discuss two themes related to
genocide studies: the positionality of the scholar and a model for genocide analysis.
Pitfalls and Problems
The study of genocide has never generated consensus among students of the phenome-
non. Some colleagues have even rejected the use of the word, citing politicization and
lack of complexity as sources of misunderstanding.5 These are laudable concerns, but I
believe we should preserve the concept, provided that we remain vigilant with respect to
four perspectives: emotional, moral, legal, and political approaches.
First, let us consider the emotional constraints of genocide studies. All social
research operates amidst the tension between involvement and detachment. As a gen-
eral problem in the academy it has been dealt with at some length, and the study of vio-
lence is particularly relevant from the perspective of involvement and detachment.6
Many people ﬁnd the topic intrinsically repulsive and react with strong condemnatory
emotions. Although a certain amount of passion and involvement can determine a
scholar’s choice to study this topic, a great deal of detachment is necessary to sift
through multitudes of documents and memoirs describing very intimate details of kill-
ing. Iris Chang’s suicide, reportedly suffering from depression due to research on Japa-
nese war crimes in China, might be an extreme example of excessive involvement.7 But
even a seasoned researcher such as Robert J. Lifton confessed in the introduction to his
book The Nazi Doctors that during the research process he had “nightmares about
Auschwitz, sometimes involving my wife and children.”8 All in all, intensive research
on violence can be straining when one is emotionally involved, and detachment remains
important.
To illustrate how emotions interfere in genocide research, let us turn to empathy.
Empathy is the capacity to recognize and, to some extent, share other human beings’
feelings. It comprises the cognitive and affective process of “the inner experience of
sharing in and comprehending the momentary psychological state of another person.”9
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In other words, emotions can be contagious. Anyone studying genocide cannot help but
feel intense anger and hatred toward genocide and its perpetrators. This is a conse-
quence of empathy: the real, existing emotions of the victim group contaminate the
scholar. A personal example can elucidate this point. In the summer of 2007, I was fea-
tured in the documentary Land of our Grandparents, during which time I traveled to
Eastern Turkey to trace the life of genocide survivor Vahram Goekjian, whose moving
memoir I had read.10 In the documentary, we encounter a group of Turks partying in a
place that was the site of a massacre in 1915 and I make a rancorous comment. Many
viewers found this an unnecessary expression of acrimony, even wrath. Even I found
my response unduly overweening when I watched the documentary much later, but
after some reﬂection I now understand why I made the comment; as a result of empa-
thy, the emotions of the victim group (Armenians) had deeply affected me. Indeed,
Armenian audiences that watched the documentary understood me quite well, but for
most viewers I came across as exceedingly emotional. For this reason, genocide studies
is an isolating experience; the more one is absorbed into the material, the more one is
drawn into these emotions through empathy. This process can lead to a certain loneli-
ness, the feeling of not being understood by most people, and even professional defor-
mations such as the development of an esoteric sense of black humor, which again
isolates the genocide scholar further from mainstream society.11
A good way to think about involvement and detachment is the axis of tension
between sacralization and trivialization. These two opposing forces can best be seen as
poles on a continuum, and genocide scholars should maintain vigilance against both. At
the one extreme, there is sacralization: victim activists sometimes mystify the phenome-
non as an inexplicable horror that we cannot possibly fathom. Their history is sacred,
they enjoy moral immunity, and the memory of their genocide has indeed been made
into a religion by some. Their visits to sites such as death camps resemble pilgrimages
as though they are out to catch some historical aura. This kind of approach is perfectly
understandable from their perspective, but it carries some risks too. It places taboos on
complex and ambivalent questions and does not help us better understand genocide. At
the other end of the continuum there is trivialization. Spurious associations lead to the
inﬂation of the concept and banalize it. For example, genocide has been applied to
phenomena as disparate as the spread of AIDS, the 2003 American invasion of Iraq,
postcolonial immigration to Britain, and Hurricane Katrina. At its most pernicious, tri-
vialization includes deliberate genocide denial.
A second pitfall is moralization. Most people, but even some scholars, think about
genocide in terms of good versus evil. Indeed, many books on genocide include the
word “evil” in their main titles, usually coupled with a harrowing picture of skulls on
the book cover. But a manicheistic divide between purely evil perpetrators and purely
good victims is not at all helpful in explaining processes of mass violence. The myth of
pure evil is a form of pre-scientiﬁc thought with a strong religious overtone.12 Popular
representations of genocide often stagnate at this level of imagery. For example, a Chan-
nel 5 documentary titled The Most Evil Men and Women in History contains footage on
Nero, Vlad Tepeş the Impaler, King John, Ivan the Terrible, Attila the Hun, Rasputin,
Hitler, Pol Pot, and Idi Amin.13 The accompanying book reads, “There are some evil
people in this world, when you think about the killing, torturing, bombing and maiming
and this book covers it all.”14 The example of Vlad Tepeş’s violence against enemies
and prisoners of war contains only images of cruelty: “He was a fan of various forms of
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torture including disembowelling and rectal and facial impalement. Vlad the Impaler
tortured thousands while he ate and drank among the corpses.”15 But in the same
breath, Stalin’s “evil” is then interpreted as a matter of magnitude.16 Secular political
leaders are portrayed as devils incarnate.
The imagery of evil is so powerful that it percolates into scholarship. Professional
historians also sometimes ﬁnd it difﬁcult to avoid the pitfall of moralization. Simon
Sebag Monteﬁore’s Monsters: History’s Most Evil Men and Women treats the following
persons: Caligula, Richard III, Adolf Eichmann, Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Charles Manson,
Herman Cortes, Hitler, Al Capone, Lavrenti Beria, Lucrezia Borgia, Nicolae Ceauşescu,
Vlad the Impaler, Saddam Hussein, Simon de Montfort, Pablo Escobar, Ivan the Terri-
ble, Genghis Khan, Idi Amin, Attila the Hun, Josef Mengele, Heinrich Himmler, Mao
Zedong, Osama bin Laden, Kim Il Sung, Slobodan Milošević, Empress Cixi, and Tomas
de Torquemeda.17 By lumping disparate political leaders together into a single pantheon
of evil, both books are deeply ahistorical and asociological in their juxtapositions. The
media’s depiction of ongoing political violence, which profoundly shapes popular per-
ceptions of violence, is no more sophisticated. Whereas violent individuals such as
suicide terrorists, rampage shooters, or dictators are often seen as evil incarnate, when
groups such as paramilitary units, political parties, or even entire societies descend into
violence, this descent is often attributed to madness or some other collective psychiatric
disorder.18 Moralistic approaches to genocide only serve to strengthen this kind of
thought and do not add anything substantial to our understanding of it.
There can be no doubt that genocide is a crime and its perpetrators are criminals.
Nevertheless, a third approach that we should try to avoid is the legalistic one. In legal
practice, which at the international level is closely concerned with genocide, the objec-
tive is not necessarily to ﬁnd out the causes and mechanisms of genocide but to prose-
cute and convict people. We should avoid the overuse of terms such as “crime,”
“criminal(s),” “punishment,” “blame,” and especially “guilt.” In a lucid essay, the Dutch
sociologist Van Benthem van den Bergh discussed the question of guilt as a means of
intellectual orientation. He argued that the judicial system assumes that the individual
and the society are two different realities, and he further noted that the courts that
judge the criminals are not part of the human structures of that same society. An indi-
vidual (or group of individuals) is accused of an act, and he or she must be judged as
guilty or not guilty. Law does not concern itself with the nature of relationships between
people or complex long-term processes, and it is purely interested in qualifying a single
act and isolating it in a person. (Social science, on the other hand, looks at interpersonal
or intergroup relations and treats individuals as intersection points of complex rela-
tional vectors.) Establishing a perpetrator’s guilt is taken to mean that the cause of vio-
lence is a certain amount of evil in that perpetrator (a reiﬁcation or personiﬁcation of
evil) and that the search for other causes can be terminated.19 This binary thought pro-
cess sustains monocausality and leads to often-heard debates such as “was it genocide
or not?” All in all, guilt and blame are not helpful points of departure for understanding
genocidal processes.
Furthermore, legal responses to genocide are much more a product of politics and
compromise than scholarly ones generally are. At the 1945 Nuremberg trials, signiﬁcant
concessions were awarded to the Soviet Union, whose prosecutors and judges such as
Andrey Vyshinskiy, Roman Rudenko, Lev Sheinin, and Iona Nikitchenko had been up
to their knees in blood during the 1930s. At Nuremberg, Stalin’s juridical accomplices
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succeeded in obscuring the true nature of the Soviet massacre of Polish military and
civilian elites, in which some were even personally complicit.20 After the Cold War, as
hopes of an international human rights regime rose, some aspects of international law
did not change. It was not an absolute, moral yardstick but an outcome of compromises
struck between perpetrator elites and third parties. For example, when Radovan Kar-
adzić was arraigned at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), he claimed that US envoy Richard Holbrooke promised him immunity from
prosecution if he withdrew from politics.21 Holbrooke passed away in 2010 and carried
the truth to the grave, and we will probably never know the details. But Carla del Ponte
hints at the existence of such deals as well in her unvarnished memoir of her tenure as
prosecutor at the ICTY.22 Legal responses to genocide lack relative autonomy from
power and do not offer a useful mode of orientation.
Finally, the fourth, and perhaps most important, danger that looms over genocide
research is politics. Lobbyists, identity politics, activism and advocacy groups, and espe-
cially states use the concept not in a scholarly way but as a politischer Kampfbegriff
(political combat concept) as hollow rhetoric. They have a vested interest in misrepre-
senting the truth and they often operate with legal and moral agendas. Political violence
is politically very sensitive. The quintessential example of how lasting the damage is that
genocide generates is the Turkish-Armenian conﬂict. Almost a full century after the
event, group relations between these two neighboring ethnic groups are bitterly tense,
both at the informal level and the formal, interstate level. Scholarship on the genocide is
deeply politicized and only in recent years has steered away from partisanship and
reached a modicum of normality.23 Politicization originates from all directions. Victim
group activists demand genocide recognition not only because of the caedere aspect of
the concept (i.e., the violence itself) but also because of the genos dimension of genocide
(i.e., the collective nature of the violence). The victims often believe that they have been
destroyed as a nation. Hence, recognition conﬁrms group identity and acknowledges
and reinstates the group’s membership in a global family of nations.24 Critics, opposition
groups, and the Left also engage in politicization; decades of fellow traveling with the
Soviet Union testiﬁes to this. But even after the collapse of communism, the Left’s
response to mass violence has not always been prudent. An excellent example is Marko
Attila Hoare’s devastating analysis of how left-wing European revisionists, by champion-
ing the Milošević regime as Europe’s last “socialist” government, abandoned its Yugoslav
victims and failed to respond appropriately to the violence.25 The politics of genocide
are also embedded in a dense international force ﬁeld in which genocide is abused as a
diplomatic trump card. A clear example of international hypocrisy in denouncing geno-
cide was the treatment of Kurds in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Turkey and Iraq.
Whereas the Anfal campaign in Iraq, which cost approximately 150,000 Kurds their
lives, was vigorously denounced, a deafening silence reigned regarding the Turkish
army’s blanket destruction of 3,000 Kurdish villages across the border. The diplomacy of
genocide stems mostly from geopolitical interests between allies and enemies.26
The main catalyst in the politicization of genocide is the state. For some states,
genocide denial is part and parcel of their collective identity process or national security
concepts. Robert Hayden pointed out that “genocide has been a tool for building a
number of nation states that are now honorable members of the world community.”27
The identity politics and genocide denial of states that enjoy global legitimacy manifest
themselves when governments, discontented with scholars searching for “skeletons in
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the closet,” deny access to archival collections and libraries or prohibit them from con-
ducting ﬁeld work. The opposite situation is also possible: governments might try to
foster or manipulate research by funding politically useful research by pushing for the
establishment of academic chairs at home or abroad or by offering scholarships. Exam-
ples include both the Turkish and Armenian governments’ manipulation of research on
the Armenian Genocide, Israel’s sacralization and monopolization of Jewish victimhood
in the Holocaust, Iran’s willingness to sponsor Holocaust denial, the former Ukrainian
government’s ofﬁcial declaration of the 1932–1933 famine as genocide, and the Rwan-
dan government’s exclusion of Hutu from the category of Rwandan genocide victims.28
This dense political and moral ﬁeld has affected scholarship in quite fundamental ways.
For this reason, Max Weber’s classical distinction between politics as a vocation and
science as a vocation should be written in stone for genocide scholars.
Victor Hugo famously said “If a man is killed in Paris, it is a murder; the throats of
ﬁfty thousand people are cut in the East, and it is a question.”29 Although politicization
has not (and will never be) surmounted, genocide studies has managed to overcome
this kind of orientalism and methodological racism in the study of mass violence. It is
to the credit of genocide scholars that orientalist approaches to violence have been sub-
dued. Too often, génocidaires outside of Europe have been romanticized as products of
ostensibly brutal cultures. Moreover, modern political crimes have been attributed to in-
herently evil crooks with large moustaches, living in exotic areas such as the Balkans
and the Caucasus and possessed by oriental despotism and barbaric tribalism. For
example, in accounts of the Armenian Genocide, the perpetrators, from the organizing
elites to the rank-and-ﬁle executioners, have too often ﬁgured as evil faceless killers, un-
differentiated and unexplained. The perpetrators appear in the Anatolian killing ﬁelds
ex nihilo and murder people for no apparent reason other than innate (Turkish or
Islamic) cruelty and malignance. These kinds of caricatures not only romanticize the
perpetrators but play down the experiences of the victims. “The death of one man is a
tragedy, the death of a million is a statistic.” This harrowing quote, commonly (and
probably wrongfully) attributed to Stalin, was the norm in orientalist views of genocide,
in which the victims were not individuals but statistics. After all, they were only replace-
able and expendable masses of illiterate peasants, anonymous villagers, or invisible sub-
alterns anyway. Implicitly racist biases such as these continue to be undermined in
research on mass violence, in which individual victims and perpetrators are taken ser-
iously. Genocide studies needs to continue to reject essentialist platitudes and treat each
and every individual and group as actors in a power struggle.
All in all, genocide research must strive to be dispassionate, amoral, non-juridical,
and apolitical. Genocide can be studied, if not objectively and impartially, with due
scholarly care.
Promises
A recent, profound, subtle, and nuanced study of genocidal violence is Jacques Seme-
lin’s Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide.30 The book is
eminently interdisciplinary, covers a broad chronological and geographical perspective,
and successfully integrates different theories. The tone is detached and the book has
well-planned and effective moments of rest as well as acceleration. Semelin focuses on
three cases by asking the following question: What did Germany in the 1930s, Yugosla-
via in the late 1980s, and Rwanda in the early 1990s have in common that each came to
such horriﬁc violence?
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Semelin unfolds his model from the strong core concept of “imaginary,” a noun
that comprises the totality of ideas, emotions, and images that a social group or society
has about itself. It is the deﬁnition of the “us,” the in-group. The social imaginary is a
socio-affective process subject to manipulation by political elites. This construct is con-
tinuously shaped by politicians and other prominent public ﬁgures. Semelin discusses
how, in times of crisis, politicians increasingly come to forge this imaginary around
three themes: identity, purity, and security. The ﬁrst theme refers to identity politics, a
form of politics that revolves around the self-interest of a self-proclaimed identity
group, often on ethnic, religious, or racial grounds. The objective of identity politics is
to deﬁne and elevate the in-group and to fuel polarization between the in-group and de-
spised others. Second, purity is a crucial theme that reforges the imaginary as society
begins to imagine itself as a dirty nest. Catharsis can be achieved only by “cleansing,”
which, by the way, is genocidal elites’ favorite verb. Finally, Semelin discusses the multi-
dimensional concept of security, which can be understood in territorial, cultural, eco-
nomic, and emotional terms. When these social dimensions come under pressure,
radical elites can construct an imaginary of fear and anxiety. They then determine that
only the destruction of an (often internal) enemy can neutralize threats. The primary
components in the three themes of identity, purity, security are life versus death and
existence versus destruction. In times of political crisis, they can appeal to large seg-
ments of the population and serve to justify violence against certain groups.
Purify and Destroy is useful for genocide scholars for its analytical structure, which
can metaphorically be imagined like a three-pronged Matryoshka doll. This design par-
adigm can be analyzed at the macro, meso, and micro levels, bearing in mind the rele-
vant connections between the three levels. The macro level refers to interstate structures
and the context of geopolitical power relations. The meso level consists of all intrastate
developments relevant to the genesis of the political crisis and, later, the genocide. The
micro level, then, is about how individuals become involved in the genocidal process
either as perpetrators, victims, or third parties. Viewed in its coherence, rather than a
pyramid structure, a Matryoshka doll might be a better visualization of a model. These
three contextual layers are not simply piled on top of each other, but the largest contexts
are conditions for the smallest ones. Without the macro context of interstate crisis,
there cannot be an internal radicalization of the political elites; and without that radica-
lization, the violent measures against the victims would not have been taken and count-
less individual perpetrators would not have murdered innumerable individual victims
in micro situations of killing. If we take this structure as a starting point, there is a lot
we know about genocide. In what follows, I shall brieﬂy discuss these three contexts,
using recent and forthcoming studies of genocide.
The macro level concerns the international context and structure of geopolitical
power relations that could lead to war. It is most often binary international conﬂicts
that escalate into war and (potentially) genocidal situations: Turkey–Greece, Germany–
USSR, Cambodia–Vietnam, Serbia–Croatia, Rwanda–Burundi. During war the main
condition for genocide is often met. Violence is already widely exercised, ﬁrst only
between standing armies in legally legitimate military hostilities but later also in crimi-
nal para-state operations. One binary axis of tension that has been studied in-depth is
that between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Ernst Nolte’s 1986 argument that
the Nazi genocide was a reaction to Stalinist mass murders (including the Gulag), trig-
gered the Historikerstreit but did not substantially confront the problem of interstate
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polarization.31 Conversely, recent research has recognized that their relations, whether
rapprochement or antagonism, inﬂuenced the course and nature of their violence. Tim-
othy Snyder’s mammoth Bloodlands makes the argument that the two regimes wittingly
(and unwittingly) “enabled” each other’s crimes in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.32 On
the other hand, antagonism unleashed violence of a different nature, which Michael
Geyer and Mark Edele paraphrase as follows: “Seen as a totality, the war in the ‘East’
started with a rapid-ﬁre escalation of unrestraint on the German side . . . and was coun-
tered by a distinct radicalization and barbarization in the context of defense measures
by the Soviets, which in turn triggered a radicalization and barbarization process on the
side of the aggressor.”33 These sophisticated studies on the interstate context of mass
violence can be replicated in other cases.
Apart from the relations between discrete states, the international state system as a
changing, unpredictable constellation needs more attention as well. Before the growth
of international and transnational organizations, states often championed humanitarian
intervention, while under the surface playing a dirty game of manipulative diplomacy.
The Cold War only exacerbated this existing, structural problem as the United States
and the Soviet Union fought proxy wars and expressed moral indignation at mass vio-
lence opportunistically. Forthcoming research on genocide focuses on Western coun-
tries’ responses to mass violence in postcolonial states as one dimension of Cold War
politics.34 Since the 1990s, studies of the role of the United Nations have exposed the
organization’s inertia in the face of genocide, for example in Rwanda. They have also
demonstrated that this apathy (and states’ knowledge of it) can even contribute to the
commission of genocide.35 The politics of the macro level profoundly inﬂuence the
lower two levels. For example, on 14 July 2008 the International Criminal Court (ICC)
in the Hague indicted Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir on counts of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. A year later the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir
and indicted him for genocide as well. The Sudanese government retaliated by expelling
international aid agencies and intensifying the violence on the ground against Dar-
furis.36 In other words, a well-intended and justiﬁable act by the ICC inadvertently
caused more misery for the victims.
Below the macro level of international relations, the second Matryoshka enters into
force. Within the structure of war are nestled intrastate developments such as the ideo-
logical self-hypnosis of political elites, complex decision-making processes, the necessity
and logic of a division of labor, the emergence of paramilitary troops, and any mass
mobilization for the segregation and destruction of the victim group. The inception of
genocide is a central problem we need to understand better. Popular myths hold that
countries descend into “madness” as people pick up clubs and machetes to batter their
neighbors in a violent anarchy. Surely genocide is always organized by political leader-
ship, but we need to recognize as well that generally these enormous processes have sur-
prisingly few practical organizers at the top. For example, Aktion Reinhard murdered
approximately two million Jews and was set up by Christian Wirth, Odilo Globocnik,
Franz Stangl, and Irmfried Eberl. In the Soviet Union, it was Stalin’s inner circle that or-
ganized the mass murders: Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar Kagano-
vich, Andrei Zhdanov, and Nikolai Yezhov. Hundreds of thousands of people were
murdered within a year across the huge country upon orders from half a dozen men. So
too in the Armenian Genocide. A small group around Talaat Pasha organized the geno-
cide; Dr. Bahaeddin Shakir, Dr. Mehmed Nazım, Ali Münif, Şükrü Kaya, and a few
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fanatical governors wiped out almost the entire Armenian community of the Ottoman
Empire.
The decision-making process consists of the initiation of a genocidal policy and
further developments. Two assumptions should be avoided. First, one should not search
for the order, the decree that authorizes absolute destruction and separates the pre-vio-
lent period from murder. Genocide generally develops through radicalizing phases that
come as shocks to existing policies. A sophisticated literature exists on this subject in
the ﬁeld of Holocaust history.37 Second, political elites do not and cannot always foresee
the consequences of the decisions they take. Persecution can develop into expulsion and
expulsion can escalate into mass killing, and each shift in policy can be an unintended
consequence of the previous one. For example, during dekulakization in 1930–1931 the
Soviets deported 1.8 million kulaks (better-off peasants) to Siberia. When tension with
Japan grew in the 1930s, the kulaks’ presence in the Soviet-Japanese borderlands was
seen as an internal liability and many were killed after all to subdue an “insurgent rebel-
lion.” In other words, “one repressive policy created the foundation for another.”38 The
genocidal process is to some extent an unintended but directional process (a blind pro-
cess),39 and determinism should be avoided.
I will now brieﬂy discuss one important issue relevant to the meso level: regional
variation in genocides. Regionalization and de-regionalization are important themes in
recent genocide research. Genocide scholars have examined the relationship between
central decision-making processes and the implementation of mass murder at the local
level. In-depth research on how the genocidal process evolves at the provincial, district,
city, or even village level has proven to be a fruitful endeavor. It can teach us a great deal
about how local shifts in power dynamics can inﬂuence the course and intensity of geno-
cidal processes, some of which, as we know, are more regionally disparate than others.
Local political or social elites can anticipate, expedite, intensify, or delay and resist geno-
cidal destruction steered from above. A meso focus can also follow the deterioration and
ultimate disintegration of intercommunal relations as a result of external pressures,
amidst drastically worsening security conditions for the victims.40 These insights at the
meso level of the Matryoshka doll illustrate how dynamics within the perpetrator group
can account for variation during genocide. They also instruct us that even if genocides
unfold on twisted paths, the eventual result is still destruction. It is a desideratum of
future research to penetrate deeper into and probe further the complexity of genocides.
Tucked away at the heart of the three Matryoshkas lies the smallest but most ven-
omous doll: the countless killings of defenseless victims carried out by perpetrators. The
central question at this level is, How do ordinary people become involved in genocide?
Or, to quote Alexander Hinton, “Why did they kill?”41 Comparative research on geno-
cide perpetrators is gradually reﬂecting common ground and increasing sophistication
of this subject.42 Horizontal pressure (group conformism), vertical pressure (coercion in
a command structure), and routinization are major mechanisms that propel massacre.
Genocidal behavior such as sexual violence and cruelty are part and parcel of this level
only. Moreover, the interdependence of the macro, meso, and micro levels of genocide
runs both up and down: just as the macro context of crisis and war is a precondition
for micro-level killings, so too the success of political elites’ attempt to destroy a victim
group is dependent on the mobilization of perpetrators. The génocidaires need to
believe and act in a way that facilitates the genocide as smoothly as possible. Through-
out the killing process, they experience an increase in role distance, a development in
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which particular commitments and principles give them the moral integrity to carry out
the murders.43
One of the cornerstones in the research on rank-and-ﬁle perpetrators is undoubt-
edly Christopher Browning’s highly acclaimed Ordinary Men. This powerful study is
famous for adopting a socio-psychological model of obedience to authority to explain
the behavior of German perpetrators. Browning’s research is based on a substantial pri-
mary source, records that were housed in the Central Ofﬁce for State Justice Adminis-
trations (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen) in Ludwigsburg, near Stuttgart.
He beneﬁted from an extensive collection of records that included later interrogations
of the perpetrators who carried out the massacres. Browning writes, “Never before had I
encountered the issue of choice so dramatically framed by the course of events and so
openly discussed by at least some of the perpetrators. Never before had I seen the mon-
strous deeds of the Holocaust so starkly juxtaposed with the human faces of the kill-
ers.”44 Another example of perpetrator research drawn from the Yugoslav wars is a
chapter in Slavenka Drakulić’s book, They Would Not Hurt A Fly.45 Drakulić uses ICTY
hearings to paint a picture of Goran Jelišić, a Bosnian Serb who was known as an ordi-
nary, quiet young man who enjoyed life and liked ﬁshing but who, in 1992, ran a deten-
tion center where he tortured and shot possibly hundreds of people. Indeed, he
murdered without mercy, without distinction, and without consequences.
What emerges from these studies of perpetrators is a nuanced and complex discus-
sion of dispositional and situational factors. But this is where the research reaches its
boundaries. Browning, Waller, Welzer, Drakulić, and others have studied different gen-
ocides but reached remarkably similar conclusions, which has become a solidiﬁed com-
monplace in genocide research: anybody can become a perpetrator under the “right”
conditions. The Milgram experiments,46 which offered a psychological underpinning of
this thesis, have been replicated and have apparently yielded uniform results across so-
cieties. However, there are grounds to question this established wisdom. Recent research
has focused on differences in empathy among human beings.47 Some people are
equipped with lower levels of empathy at birth, and some people are able to “switch
off” their empathy with other people (including victims) better than others. Both of
these arguments on disposition have consequences for the study of genocide. Based on
a more controlled replication of Milgram’s experiments, the psychologist Jerry Burger
has argued, “Participants who were high in empathic concern expressed a reluctance to
continue the procedure earlier than did those who were low on this trait.”48 The societal
dehumanization that accompanies the genocidal process, then, cannot but further exac-
erbate this and render individuals more susceptible to the process of genocide perpetra-
tion. Forthcoming research will hopefully ﬂesh out this problem and offer more
complex answers.49
This Matryoshka model with its three levels of analysis can be seen as a set of com-
plex processes that trigger the initiation and execution of mass political violence. The le-
vels roughly correspond to academic disciplines: whereas political scientists study the
macro level, sociologists may be more interested in the intrastate meso level, and the
micro level is perhaps an object of study within the domain of psychology. Genocides
can best be seen as a complex interplay of developments in this three-tier structure. The
model is by no means meant to be an exhaustive evaluation or comprehensive research
program but merely a model for possible future research into relevant new directions in
genocide research.
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Conclusion: Grapes and Wrath
Comparative research can be a rewarding and meaningful effort, but without models or
theories research on genocide quickly reaches its limits. Without a theoretical perspec-
tive or a modicum of conceptualization, there is a risk of tracing only superﬁcial simila-
rities rather than delving deeply into parallel biographies, analogous structures, and
similar developments. Empirical density cannot substitute for clear reasoning. Digging
for and locating relevant evidence is important, but the materials must be sufﬁciently
integrated into a study as a whole. In other words, not only do the grapes have to be
picked, but the juice of the grapes must be fermented in order to create wine.
Finally, the consequences of genocide cannot be captured in the happy endings
characteristic of Hollywood. (Perhaps this is why Hollywood has never produced a single
ﬁlm on genocide with a fairly realistic plot.) The rule is not rescue and escape into free-
dom, but denial and impunity. Even worse, the consequences of traumatization and vic-
timization can potentially lead to more violence and (cycles of) revenge. Studies of
genocides often (rightfully) draw sharp dividing lines between “perpetrators” and “vic-
tims” and lock these immutable roles at that particular segment in history.50 But hu-
mans’ potentially multiple roles in genocidal processes are often overlooked or
ignored.51 Moreover, survivors and victim communities are too often patronized as hav-
ing drawn universalist humanist lessons from their victimization and are often expected
to forgive and “reconcile,” a deeply problematic concept. On the contrary, victimized in-
dividuals and groups often feel vindictive (with or without justice) and can call for ven-
geance as a justiﬁed response to victimization. Political elites often capitalize on desires
of vengeance among victim groups. Once mobilized, when such a process of collective
vengeful desire escalates and crosses the threshold of violence, we are back to square one.
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